

CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL TELEVISION BROADCASTING AND THE SPANISH SPEAKING WORLD

Dani Madrid-Morales

Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC)

Abstract

In speeches, statements and international meetings CPC leaders have repeatedly voiced their concern about a general negative perception of China amongst public opinions abroad. To 'correct' such non-positive views public diplomacy and the affine term 'soft power' have become prominent in China's foreign policy. One of the dimensions of public diplomacy in which China has invested extensively to revert its current image is international broadcasting. China's Central Television currently airs content aimed at foreign audiences in five languages other than Chinese (English, French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic) in five dedicated channels broadcasting 24 hours a day. This paper focuses on CCTV-E, the channel aimed at the Spanish speaking world, particularly at Latin American audiences. In an attempt to fill in a gap in research on international broadcasting in East Asia, this paper discusses the origins and evolution of television broadcasting in Spanish in China. I start by placing CCTV-E in the wider perspective of Chinese public diplomacy and the frenetic pursue of soft power in recent years. I then examine key features, contents and production routines, and how these can help better understand strengths and shortcomings of CCTV-E. To conclude, I argue that, despite being chosen as the second foreign-language in which broadcasting was carried out, Spanish has progressively become less strategic in China's overall international broadcasting efforts even if it is still perceived as an asset in a long-term project to increase Chinese contents and perspectives in international communication and information flows.

Keywords

CCTV-E, international broadcasting, public diplomacy, Chinese media, soft power

*'Success depends not only on whose army wins,
but also on whose story wins.'*

Josep S. Nye

*'The soft and gentle overcome the hard and
strong.'*

Laozi

Between March and April 2007, for about two weeks, Li Changchun, member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee, visited several Latin America countries.¹ Shortly after his return to Beijing, preparations began for the launch of CCTV-E as an independent channel broadcasting 24-hours a day in Spanish to Latin American audiences. The official launch was on October 1, 2007. It is difficult to establish a clear cut cause-effect relation between the events, but it is arguable that some links may exist. Li, being Chairman of the Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization (*Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng Zhōng yāng Jīngshénwénmíng Jiànshè Zhǐdǎo Wěiyuánhùi*) –the *de facto* propaganda organ and by extension an ideological helmsman within the CPC– is credited as one of the masterminds behind the current period of international expansion of China's state media, including China's Central Television (CCTV). Some scholars have recently begun to discuss these outward media strategies (Jirik 2008; Sun 2009; Zhang 2010), but none specifically discusses foreign-language products other than English. This paper aims at making an initial contribution to the study of international broadcasting in Spanish and, more generally, to the rising phenomenon of what I call *television diplomacy* in East Asia: using television content as a foreign policy tool.² In an effort to bridge two disciplines that are growingly interconnected, I will use

¹ Li visited Peru, Venezuela, Mexico and Suriname in Latin America and, at the end of his trip, made a stop in Samoa in the Pacific.

² China has, by considerable length, the largest international broadcasting system in the region. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan do also have an extensive multi-lingual network of radio broadcasting services, mostly via the Internet. Tokyo and Seoul also have launched their respective international broadcasting channels in English. For a comprehensive review of these initiatives see Tanaka (2009). For more general literature on the issue, most research on the dynamics of international

concepts of communication theory and international relations to explain why the use of international television broadcasting as part of public diplomacy has become crucial to some countries, both developed and transitional economies. After an initial elaboration on public diplomacy theory –if one as such can be said to exist– the paper turns to the case of CCTV-E to describe how the channel came about, and what stages it has gone through from the first broadcasts as part of CCTV-9 at the end of 2003 to it becoming an independent channel in 2007. I analyse the channel's programme round-down, the typology and contents of several shows and present the results of a content analysis of CCTV-E's main news bulletin, *Noticiero*. The paper concludes that lack of professionalism and political constraints hamper any efforts to compete globally with existing broadcasting networks. It also argues that Spanish has progressively become less strategic in China's overall international broadcasting efforts, despite it being the second foreign-language in which broadcasting was carried out. However, alongside the four (soon five to be) foreign-language channels, CCTV-E is still perceived as an important asset in a long-term effort to present a 'Chinese perspective' against hegemonic discourses in international information and communication flows. The findings in this paper are based on empirical analysis, in-depth interviews, direct observation and literature review.³

International television broadcasting as a tool for enhanced public diplomacy

Public diplomacy's core purpose is influencing the public and leaders of foreign nations (Heller & Persson 2009: 225), that is to say that its main goal is winning over foreign public opinion. These seemingly vague and simple statements are, nonetheless, very much useful to grasp the complexity of a concept has grown to have multiple interpretations since it was reintroduced into the vocabulary of diplomats and foreign affairs' officials in 1965 by Edward Gullion, a former US foreign service official who set up, that year, a research centre at Tufts University (Cull 2008: 31). The reintroduction occurred at a time –the Cold War– of very

broadcasting has focused on European and North-American television outlets (Browne 1982; Tudesq 1997; Clark & Werder 2007; Price et al. 2008; Kolmer & Semetko 2010) and only tangentially on Asian broadcasters (Jirik 2008; Wu & Ng 2011).

³ Despite repeated attempts and requests to be able to visit the facilities of CCTV and to meet with editors and news producers, it has not been possible to carry out research on location. However, several interviews with staff from CCTV-E and former employees have given priceless insights on the dynamics of news production and the processes of decision making in the newsroom. Unfortunately, because CCTV employees are explicitly banned from giving interviews, I am not allowed to reveal the names of the people I interviewed. Whenever possible, I will refer to these interviews as the source of some particular piece of information. It goes without saying that I am highly indebted to all interviewees for providing me with highly valuable information and for helping me build a, hopefully, more coherent analysis.

intense public diplomacy activity, even if most practitioners would have never called it that way then. At time of (re)coinage, public diplomacy was used to describe a set of not so new practices which for several years had been referred to as, simply, propaganda. What Gullion realised, though, was that the negative connotations that the 'older' term had accumulated were hindering its efficiency.⁴

“Once the word had an honourable meaning, as in ‘to propagate,’ and gave its name to an arm of the Roman Catholic Church charged with gaining converts in various parts of the world. As late as 1914, the word meant taking pride in one’s quality product, for example, explaining to prospective customers why the American Steinway concert grand was the best in the world. World War I changed the meaning of propaganda forever. It is synonymous, in the popular mind, with ‘lies,’ particularly lies told by a government.” (Culbert 2010: 421)

In a study of public diplomacy, mostly focused on the United States and the Soviet Union, Gilboa identifies three stages in the evolution of modern public diplomacy: Cold War public diplomacy, post-Cold War public diplomacy and post-9/11 public diplomacy. In the first stage, emerging from an information battle during World War II, “the idea was to provide the public in the target society with more balanced information on one’s own country to counter the domestic propaganda of the target society’s government”. Gilboa adds that both countries “primarily used international broadcasting to shape favourable public attitudes toward their respective rival ideologies.” (2008: 59) In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the job of reaching out to a growing global public opinion was no longer confined to the offices of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Information. More actors started to appear on the international communication scene, making it more difficult for states to deliver unequivocal messages to targeted audiences. This long transitional period, the second stage in Gilboa’s periodization, led to what some scholars are now calling ‘new public diplomacy’ (Potter 2003; Vickers 2004; Melissen 2005; Gilboa 2006; Seib 2009). This new stage starts, roughly, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and is very much related to the revolution in new information technologies. Melissen posits that “new public diplomacy moves away from—to put it crudely—peddling information to foreigners and keeping the foreign press at bay, towards engaging with foreign

⁴ The term propaganda has since lost all of its appeal in most democracies, as it is generally understood in terms of non-strictly factual information created by not-so democratic governments. It could be interesting to note, however, that the avoidance of any references to propaganda in the United States, Russia or Europe is not shared by all countries. China, for example, still uses the term *xuānchuán* in most of its public information departments, starting with the Department of Propaganda (*Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuán Bù*), which, nonetheless, has had its official English name changed to Publicity Department.

audiences.” (2005: 10) In a sense, public diplomacy until the 1990s consisted in “governments talking to global publics (G2P),” and included “efforts to inform, influence, and engage those publics in support of national objectives and foreign policies”, whilst in the 21st Century public diplomacy is widely understood by scholars –focusing mostly in the US– as “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions that bear directly on another government's foreign policy decisions (P2P).” (Snow 2009: 6)

In this new multi-player and multi-directional scenario, in which not only states engage in public diplomacy, but also NGO's and private corporations, the necessary tools and instruments for practice come from very different fields, thus making the study of this ‘new public diplomacy’ one that is very much multidisciplinary. It can be said that disciplines such as public relations, communication studies, diplomacy, public affairs and international relations all contribute to the formation of a theory of public diplomacy, even though its development, most authors agree, is still in an embryonic stage. Putting together a definition that encompasses all different disciplines and that is broadly accepted is not an easy task. Two seem to have gained the approval of most scholars: Tuch defines public diplomacy as “a government's process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (1990: 3), while Frederick more specifically refers to it as “activities, directed abroad in the fields of information, education, and culture, whose objective is to influence a foreign government, by influencing its citizens.” (1993: 229)

The understanding of diplomacy as open, non-hierarchical and based on a symmetrical two-way communication that some authors defend as the model to implement,⁵ cannot be said to fully describe, in any case, all public diplomacy programmes. While some countries are favouring this new model, some are still reluctant to go by it. Grunig and Huang (2000) studied how different types or organizations (mostly corporate organizations) chose their public relations programmes and concluded that an organization with an asymmetrical worldview is more likely to use asymmetrical strategies, such as two-way asymmetrical communication, whilst the opposite holds for those organizations with a symmetrical worldview. If we extend this model to nation-states, China could be said to fall into the first

⁵ See Snow and Taylor (2006) for a discussion on how the lessons learnt from the handling of public diplomacy after 9/11 in the United States signal the need for a rethinking of best practices, and Schneider (2009) for recommendations on how to engage foreign audiences steaming from non-state sponsored cultural activities.

group and, thus, still favouring largely asymmetrical strategies. An example of which is international broadcasting, as the resources and costs required for it to be implemented are not available to all individuals or states. Cull defines international broadcasting as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by using the technologies of radio, television, and the Internet to engage with foreign publics” (2008: 34). It is, in Cull’s taxonomy, one of five dimensions of public diplomacy, the other four being listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy and exchange diplomacy.

European countries were the first to embrace international broadcasting in the 1920s through short wave radio transmissions. The earliest regular radio services were carried out by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In Holland, Radio Nederland Wereldomroep partnered with Phillips, a pioneer company in radio engineering, to broadcast to the Dutch East Indies for over ten years, until 1940 (Wood 2000: 97), while the BBC World Service, launched by the British government in the 1930s, is still regarded today as one of the most prestigious examples of international radio broadcasting. In a short period of time, from the 1930s to the 1940s, the number of broadcasters expanded dramatically.⁶ To name just a few examples, the United States started the services of Voice of America, Germany created Deutsche Welle and France launched Radio France International (Bookmiller 1992). While it is evident that broadcasting services always served some foreign policy needs, there was an intrinsically different element between, for example, the BBC World Service and Voice of America. In the words of Wood, while “most international broadcasters take pride in the fact that they are the voice of their country, exemplified by station identification, Voice of America, Voice of Turkey...,” others like the BBC-WS go “to some lengths to claim the opposite – that [they are] not the voice of Great Britain but the voice of the independent BBC.” (Wood 2000: 22) This unique feature of the BBC World Service has allowed it to maintain an appearance of distance from government interests which is seen as the reason why its audience is larger than most other broadcasters. (Kelley 2009: 77) The pivotal issue behind BBC’s success seems to be, credibility, which takes us back to the fine line, if any, dividing public diplomacy and propaganda. Price excellently notes that most governments have been unable to overcome the view of international broadcasting as “as an elegant term for a complex combination of state-sponsored news, information, and what was once with pride

⁶ China’s first radio broadcasts were aired from Yan’an under the supervision of Zhou Enlai in December 1940, although the establishment of an actual radio broadcasting system did not occur until well into 1945 under the call sign XNCR. The Yan’an Xinhua Broadcasting Station (*Yán’ān Xīnhuá guǎngbò diàntái*) had a two-hour English service that reached parts of Europe, Russia and the United States and had to ‘compete’ with emissions from Nanjing (Chang 1989: 22).

called 'propaganda'." (2002: 200) The equation that equals efficient international broadcasting has three elements: credibility, audiences and resources. When finding the exact equilibrium in the three, it is possible to successfully obtain the goals that are often attributed to international broadcasting. In Browne's seminal work on international radio broadcasting, foreign-language radio services (and by extension, now, television and internet based broadcasting) are described as an instrument of foreign policy, a mirror of society, a symbolic presence, a converter and a sustainer, a coercer and intimidator, an educator, an entertainer and a seller of goods and services (1982). If we transform these different functions into communication strategies, international broadcasting becomes, essentially, a tool for self-representation (constructing a nation's image or brand),⁷ but also, particularly since the advent of 24/7 news channels, a key instrument in framing events and issues on the global news and information stage.

Until well into the 1980s, the sole means for international broadcasting were radio transmissions, which were mostly directed towards states where media freedom was largely inexistent. During the 'golden era' of international radio broadcasting only state-sponsored enterprises went into the business. The reasons are multiple: production costs were extremely high, the impact of messages was geographically very limited, and the motivations to make way into a non-profitable market were very much circumscribed to the realm of ideological battles... in which nation states might have an interest to engage themselves in, but not so much private investors. In the 1990s and early 2000s, two events/processes incited some states to shift their international broadcasting efforts (and money) to television. On the one hand there was the slow decline in use of radio equipment, due to the increased popularity of television sets. On the other, there was the raising influence of certain private media outlets in a seemingly growing global public opinion. In the early 1990's, when CNN International (CNNI) started to gain global attention, the term 'CNN effect' emerged to describe the ability of the only-news network to influence both the media agenda and the (global) political agenda.⁸ The 'CNN effect' has been largely studied, and has a large amount of followers, as well as opponents. There is, regardless of the effects that the channel might have had on the political agenda, an undeniable impact in how the media agenda is created, not exclusively on

⁷ The mandate of public broadcasters often includes a reference to the need to promote, disseminate and export 'national culture' or 'national values'.

⁸ There is abundant research on the extent to which international news networks are capable (or not capable) of setting the political agenda (Edwards 2001; Miller 2007; Opperman & Viehrig 2011), on what has been the evolution of that influence, particularly since the arrival of new networks (Robinson 2002; Seib 2008, Cushion & Lewis 2010) and on the consequences in terms of ideological and geographical representation of the so-called 'CNN effect' and similar 'counter-effects' (Corman et al. 2008; Painter 2008).

the selection of topics, but on the editorialising content. As Painter argues, CNNI and other Anglo-Saxon outlets, such as Sky News, Fox News, CNBC or BBC World contribute to the creation of a hegemonic global narrative on current affairs. Leaving BBC World aside, which is a very particular case of an independently run public enterprise, with a very high score on objectivity, despite the existence of certain underlying ideological influences, the first actors to break into the international television news market were private companies that managed to start to challenge the authority of nation-states to carry on the tasks of self-representation and issue-framing that I referred to earlier.

The arrival of a counter-dominant or counter-hegemonic narrative on global events is to be linked to the advent of a new global player in the international television news sector, Al Jazeera, the creation of which has brought the topics of mediatisation of current affairs and media-setting back to research agendas.⁹ The 'CNN effect' is now being compared to an 'Al-Jazeera effect', particularly in the Middle East. There is, nonetheless, an important difference between the two cases: whilst CNN is privately owned and largely out of the control of the US government, Al Jazeera was launched and is funded by the Emirate of Qatar; it is, thus, a *de facto* state-owned broadcasting company. Al Jazeera was quick to master the efficiency equation: it built a solid regional audience first, before going global; it gained considerable credibility, and it has been provided with sufficient resources to grow steadily but fast, into a major actor in the international news production sector. The success of the English-language version of the Doha-based station, Al Jazeera English, in challenging the hegemonic discourse can be seen as the spark that led some governments, including the Chinese authorities, to invest abundant resources to 'contribute' their own narrative and their own perspective on world events.¹⁰ The start of a *television diplomacy* 'battle' is not a 'battle' for large numbers of viewers, but one that sets to win the *hearts and minds* of global opinion makers, those that can help a nation in their quest for soft power. If we are to look for a theoretical reasoning behind these expensive investments in television services, we will need

⁹ The existence of 24/7 news channels started to grow, out of private investment, in the 1990s with the launch of channels such as CNBC, Fox News, Sky News, ChannelNewsAsia and Phoenix InfoNews. These ventures did not initially pursue a global reach and largely focused on domestic/regional audiences.

¹⁰ After the successful launch of Al Jazeera English in mid-2006, France 24 started its English-language channel at the end of the same year and Japan followed with NHK World in 2009. Previous publicly funded and operated channels in the market at the time already included Russia Today (launched by Vladimir Putin in December 2005), Deutsche Welle (on air since 1998), Euronews (in service since 1993) and CCTV-9 (launched by Beijing in 2000).

The map of actors in international broadcasting becomes more complex if one looks at languages other than English. For example, the United States created in 2004 the Al Hurra channel, a 24-hours news station in Arabic, to counterbalance the weight that Al-Jazeera (funded by the Qatari government) and Al-Arabiya (owned by the Saudi Royal Family). In 2008 BBC Arabic television went on air, shortly after Rusiya Al-Yaum started operations from Moscow. France 24, Deutsche Welle and CCTV have also started Arabic-language channels and programmes.

to turn to the notion of 'power' itself, and how it seems to be perceived nowadays. Power, "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want", says Joseph Nye, comes in three ways: threats of coercion ('sticks'), inducement and payments ('carrots'), and attraction to make others want what one wants (Nye 2008: 94). The traditional notion of power –hard power in Nye's terms– was linked to strong military capacity and powerful institutions (political or economic). The opposite of hard power is soft power. The abilities of a state to coerce, induce and pay all belong to what has been generally termed hard power, in opposition to soft power, which is achieved through attraction and co-option (Nye 2011). Some nations have learnt the hard way that soft power, now beyond the mere control of governments, can overcome some hard power strategies.

The case of post-9/11 US is if often used to exemplify the costs of non-existing or non-efficient public diplomacy programmes. In a US Senate budget hearing in 2011 Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton told the members of the Foreign Relations Committee that the US was "in an information war" and that the country was "losing that war".¹¹ Most of Clinton's message at the hearing was related to the increased influence that media from Arab countries is having in the agenda-setting process worldwide but there were also references to the imbalance in terms of public outreach efforts between the US and China.¹² The realisation that several countries are becoming more competent in publicizing themselves abroad than the US is nothing new in Washington. Republican Senator Richard G. Lugar has repeatedly voiced his concern on the same issue. In a 2010 report prepared by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Lugar wondered who was listening to American international broadcasting channels such as Voice of America or Al-Hurra and what can be done to out-power similar programmes by countries such as Russia, China or Iran.¹³ Some of the issues identified in the Lugar reports, as mentioned, were not brought to the attention of Senators and Congressmen for the first time. What is indeed new is that China is amongst the 'competent communicators' that the US administration perceives to be competing with. What the different reports, documents and statements drafted by the US Congress have in common is an apparent shared

¹¹ The full text of the testimony given by Hillary R. Clinton on March 1, 2011 can be found at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/157483.htm>. Accessed: 28 August 2011

¹² In a poignant editorial, the Financial Times referred to the speech by Hillary R. Clinton as 'The China Syndrome.' http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2ab8c5a8-45e1-11e0-acd8-00144feab49a.html#_axzz1HGNIisUN0. Accessed: 30 August 2011

¹³ There are two recent reports related to the topic that have been presented to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. On June 9, 2010, "U.S. International Broadcasting: -Is Anybody Listening?-Keeping the U.S. Connected" was presented. The full text is available at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11cp111.html>. Accessed: 12 September 2011. "Another U.S. Deficit —China and America— Public Diplomacy in the Age of the Internet" was put forward to the members of the Committee on February 15, 2011. The text is available at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11cp112.html>. Accessed: 12 September 2011

concern by American legislators that China, with all its investment in human resources can effectively become competent in communicating outwards, and therefore challenge the somewhat comfortable position that the United States have had for several years.

China's 'go out' policy and the mass media

A guiding force behind China's current pursue of soft power is the growing perception amongst Chinese elites that foreign public opinion is failing to 'understand' the rise of China, and that it is mostly because non-Chinese media recurrently frame their portrayals of the country in negative terms. In fact, several Chinese leaders have openly voiced their concern about negative perceptions of China abroad. The official discourses of a 'peaceful rise' (*héping juéqǐ*) or 'peaceful development' (*héping fāzhǎn*), and the desire of China to build a 'harmonious society' (*héxié shèhuì*) clash with non-Chinese media depictions of systemic corruption, violations of human rights, unequal development, growing income gaps and high military spending (Scollon 2001; Peng 2004; Warlaumont 2006; Stone & Xiao 2007). The peak of perceived media 'hostility' towards China occurred in 2008 shortly before the opening ceremony of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. A series of peaceful protests by Tibetan monks against government control on religious matters in Lhasa in March, evolved into a major violent clash between the Tibetan population and non-Tibetan residents (mostly Han Chinese) in the city. The story on the protests was quickly picked up by international media, particularly sensitive to China-related events in 2008. A series of malpractices by American and European television outlets and a media lockdown of Tibet by the Chinese authorities worsened the situation and magnified mutual misunderstanding. Initiatives such as the anti-CNN campaign, a website launched to condemn the hostility of foreign media towards China, became very popular amongst nationalist sectors of Chinese society. Tensions increased shortly after the Tibetan riots as protests against China's 'abuse' of human rights spread in countries such France and the United Kingdom. The fact that protesters decided to stage their demonstrations as the Olympic torch was touring the continent further infuriated parts of Chinese public opinion. Only a few months before the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games hailed by many as an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for China to showcase its development (Manzenreiter 2010: 30), the gap between the public opinions of the so-called West and China appeared to have widened. In mid-2008,

Yang summarized the climate of Sino-European/American relations, marked by perceivable political tension and mutual lack of trust, in the following terms:

“These protests provoked sharply divergent perceptions in the West and in China. The Western media generally portrayed both the Tibetan and the Olympic torch relay protests with sympathy. China's leaders and the Chinese public, by contrast, mostly saw a diabolical anti-China alliance, which included the Dalai Lama and some Hollywood figures, intent on undermining the Olympics and hurting China. Many Chinese felt humiliated and were deeply angered by what they perceived as biased news coverage.” (Yang 2008: 245)

These perceived negative media attitudes seemed to echo in public opinion polls on China's perceptions abroad, in the short and medium term. A 2010 Gallup survey on the opinion that Americans had of China showed that 53 per cent had an unfavourable opinion, against 42 per cent that voiced favourable opinions. In a list of countries by order of favouritism amongst Americans China ranked behind other economies in transition, such as India (66 per cent of favourable opinions) and Russia (47 per cent).¹⁴ In a different survey, with a larger pool of countries surveyed, the BBC World Service poll in 2011, found that perceptions on the influence of China in Europe and North-America were markedly more negative than in other countries. Over 60 per cent of respondents on the survey on ‘Global Perceptions’ in France and Germany answered that China has a negative influence in the World. In Canada and the United States, those who see China more as a threat count for 49 and 51 per cent respectively. Attitudes in Africa, Latin America and South-East Asia were very different. For example, 85 per cent of Nigerians, 61 per cent of Chileans and 63 per cent of Indonesians claimed to see China as a positive influence.¹⁵

If we go back to the notion of power introduced by Nye and apply it to China in the 21st Century, it is possible to say that the country has amassed enough influence as to be able to exercise the power of coercion and of induction. Take the Chinese economy as an example. It is now not only the second largest in the world, but it has become essential for the growth of other countries' economies. The increased interdependency of world economies and the pivotal role that China plays in the network of economic interconnectedness gives Beijing a considerable amount of power. The rebalancing of the world economy has forced many

¹⁴ For an evolution of the results of the Gallup poll on perceptions about China since the 1980s see <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1627/china.aspx>. Accessed: 24 August 2011

¹⁵ For the details of the survey, as well as comparative data on the evolution of the results, see http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar11/BBCValsUS_Mar11_rpt.pdf. Accessed: 31 August 2011

European states to rethink their relations with China, from patronization to relative servitude. China's power to coerce is also of considerable concern to some states, as they see Beijing's military capabilities increase every year, even though Chinese leaders insist in the narrative of a 'peaceful development'. It is difficult to deny China's strong hard power, but how much can it infer its soft power to change the negative attitudes in certain parts of the world? There is considerable discrepancy amongst scholars who have looked into contemporary Chinese soft power. Some have stressed the limitations and shortcomings of the current strategies (Gill & Huang 2006; Cruz de Castro 2009; Cho & Jeong 2008; Suzuki 2009); others have highlighted the effectiveness of certain policies, particularly in East and South-East Asia (Lee 2009), Africa (Fijałkowski 2011) and Latin America (Ellis 2001). Kurlantzick, in what is so far the most comprehensive study on China's soft power, used the term "charm offensive" to cover the multiplicity of strategies, programmes and practices that Beijing has launched in order to score better in terms of soft power (2007: 37).¹⁶ According to the author, the strategy is 'charming' because it is using, attraction, seduction and co-option, but it is 'offensive' because it has been launched at full speed with the hope to revert benefits in a relatively short period of time. This 'charm offensive' can be considered as a crucial aspect in China's 'go out' (*zǒu chūqù*) policy, which is often only associated to foreign investment and resource acquisition. In going out, China is not only investing in projects, financial markets and natural reserves, but it is also exporting its cultural industries; opening Chinese-language learning centres, the Confucius Institutes, and sending large numbers of students and experts overseas to promote people-to-people exchanges. The current policy choice in China resembles, to a certain extent, to the internationalization process of Japan's economy and society in the 1970s, the so-called *kokusaika*. The outward strategy in Japan brought about changes in the education system, in management styles and in foreign policy. Japan's push overseas was met with negativity and distrust by its neighbours (due to historical grievances) and its new 'allies', i.e. the United States (due to the regained economic status of Japan's manufacturing sector). Japan lacked soft power in the 1970s; today it has plenty. In this forty-year time span, Japan has developed an attractiveness that not many countries can count on. Part of the success derives from a smart use of public diplomacy strategies. At the moment, China faces a

¹⁶ I describe China's public diplomacy as a combination of four principles, very much attached to contemporary political thinking in the country: pragmatism, particularism, traditionalism and continuity. Its current policies are an extension of a long history of public diplomacy practices, starting with people-to-people exchanges and cultural activities in the 1950s to extensive advocacy programmes in countries that stood close ideologically. It is traditional and particular, in that it either employs practices that have been considered outdated by many countries or adapts new practices to add a 'Chinese twist' to them. Finally, and most definitely, public diplomacy in China in the 21st century is pragmatic because it is adaptable to the needs and objectives of the country even if it requires sacrifices in values, norms and ideas.

somewhat similar situation to that of Japan, albeit of a very much different scale. There are elements in common in the paths chosen to change the *status quo* (the investment in academic and cultural exchanges, to name two), but also considerably different objectives. One of these differences is that China wants to actively take part in the global dialogue that takes place in the sector of international news and information, so that it can offset the predominant narratives stemming from the US and Europe.

The roadmap that should lead China to making itself heard globally was outlined by Li Changchun, Chairman of the Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization, in a speech in December 2008 at the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of CCTV. In his speech, Li identified three deficiencies of the current system and made recommendations to amend them. First, Li acknowledges the lack of influence of China in mainstream international media and asks for real efforts to revert the situation; second, it encourages a true 'go out' policy for the mass media, including CCTV's international division, and finally it signals the need for further professionalization of the information and communication sectors in China in order to become more competitive globally (and domestically).¹⁷ Li specifically mentions that in order to "accelerate the 'go out' process," China needs to "strengthen and develop foreign language channels, expand into foreign television markets [and] promote the exports of television formats." He goes on to add that there is a need to "guarantee that our images and voices are heard all over the world, in every single household." Li's perspective, as the ultimate political figure in media relations and publicity/propaganda, echoes the concerns amongst the Chinese leadership about the overwhelming dominance of 'Western' companies of the international news discourse and how this largely prevents China from having its own heard.¹⁸ An example of this situation can be found in the video news agency market, which can be considered to be a duopoly with Reuters TV and Associated Press Television News, APTN, as the largest players. The fact that almost all television news outlets largely depend on the contents provided by these companies to obtain video footage from events abroad, has been regarded by scholars as an important factor in content homogenization, lack of diversified perspectives, and the narrowing down of the international news agenda. In this context, CCTV set itself the target of increasing the visibility of its television content, contributing to spreading a Chinese view

¹⁷ For a full transcript of Li's speech, see http://news.china.com/zh_cn/news100/11038989/20081223/15248144.html. Accessed: 10 September 2011. Translations in this text are of my own.

¹⁸ The three largest news agencies (in volume of subscribers) are Reuters (United Kingdom), Associated Press (United States) and Agence France-Presse (France). China's main news agency, Xinhua, one of the largest in terms of stories produced, has a limited market share in 'Western' media markets.

on global affairs and telling the 'right story' of China's recent development.¹⁹ Expanding its international television broadcasting services has been one of the chosen strategies to, ultimately, achieving these goals.

China started to broadcast content for audiences outside the country in 1992 when CCTV-4, a Chinese-language channel aimed at overseas Chinese communities, as well to residents in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, went on air. Current affairs programmes were the only feature of the channel until 1998 when a thorough rebranding was carried out in order to include 'Chinese culture' shows, as well. Programmes about Taiwan (newscasts, talk shows and documentaries) have been an essential feature of the channel since the very beginning, signalling the strong correlation between television content and foreign policy interests. In its 20 years of existence CCTV-4 has evolved from a largely unprofessional channel, run by unskilled (communication-wise) officials to a full-scale channel with a diversified run-down of programmes and three differentiated version: one for Asian audiences, one for Europe and one for North-America.

In September 2000, China inaugurated CCTV-9, a news and entertainment English-language channel. English was no newcomer to CCTV. Some programmes from CCTV's main channels had been either subtitled or dubbed into English in the past. The difference was that, English-speakers living in China, to whom persuasive messages were largely inefficient, were no longer the audience of the new channel; interest was then at audiences abroad. CCTV-9 started as a 'window onto China', that is, trying to show what China was experiencing at a time when little attention was still being paid to its domestic developments. According to Zhao and Zhu, the authors of an extensive *History of CCTV* the objectives of the channel at the time were: "promoting the excellence of Chinese culture, communicating the achievements of China's socialist construction, presenting China's principles and positions, and establishing a good image of socialist China." (2008a: 61)²⁰ As the sole Chinese international television platform, until the launch of another English-language television channel in 2010 by China's Central News Agency, Xinhua, CCTV-9 has carried the

¹⁹ In an ambitious project, CCTV launched in late 2010 a video news service, free of charge, available to subscribers of APTN and Reuters news feeds, but also to any media outlet via the Internet. The service, called CCTV News Content (<http://newscontent.cctv.com>) broadcasts an average of 10 to 15 stories every day. CCTV was already providing television footage to both APTN and Reuters, but it was exclusively focused on domestic events and was rather limited. The News Content service offers stories from China and abroad, presented in a more 'Westernized' fashion.

²⁰ Some factual elements in this section come from two documents, the *History of CCTV* mentioned above (*Zhōngyāng diànshìtái fāzhǎn shǐ*) and *CCTV's Brand Strategy* (*Zhōngyāng diànshìtái pǐnpái zhànlüè*), co-authored (at least on paper) by Zhao Huayong, the President of CCTV until 2009.

responsibility to relay major political events (CPC's Annual Conference and the National Congress of the CPC every five years) as well to present a 'Chinese perspective' on breaking news. The English-language channel editorial line was slightly reoriented in 2004 in order to give it a "global perspective, to show the World from Chinese eyes" and thus the slogan was changed from 'Your Window on China' to 'Your Window on China and the World' (2008a: 53). In April 2010, CCTV-9 ceased to operate as an exclusively English-language channel and was transformed into a Chinese/English bilingual all-documentary channel. Most of its content and strategic goals were transferred to a new 24-hours news channel in English, CCTV News. Thorough changes were, again, introduced in early 2011, when foreign news anchors and correspondents were hired in order to turn CCTV News into the 'Al-Jazeera of Asia', according to CCTV officials. The slogan of the channel is, in fact, 'CCTV News, Your Link to Asia.'

The broadcasting of contents in other languages started officially in 2004, with the launch of the third stage of an ambitious strategy to have CCTV reach, in the long term, between 130 and 140 countries, that is, four fifths of the world population (2008b: 160). The first two languages chosen were French and Spanish, which 'shared' the same channel for over three year until October 2007 when they became two independent stations, CCTV-E and CCTV-F. The development of a multi-language platform of television channels was further developed in 2010 with the addition of the Russian and Arabic Channels, CCTV- Русский and CCTV- العربية. In a period of approximately 10 years, CCTV International has gone from having one Chinese-language channel for overseas consumption, to a multi-lingual multi-channel platform in six languages with close to 20 international bureaus, and a project to add a seventh foreign-language channel in Portuguese by 2012.

The strategy in international broadcasting had been based on two keywords, later expanded to three. Beijing first pushed for quantity and diversity. In going after diversity China has become the only country in the world that runs television channels in six different languages. The expansion in terms of quantity has not been met with satisfactory audience levels, although such a view is not openly verbalized by CCTV officials.²¹ The next move has been to diversify CCTV's operations globally and increase its presence worldwide. When

21 According to an official CCTV International blog the total number of subscribers to the different international channels of CCTV was in 2010, 170.92 million people. <http://blog.cntv.cn/7089247-1087.html> Accessed: 20 August 2011.

When discussing the audience of CCTV-9, Rawnsley conceded that 90 per cent of viewers lived in China, 4 per cent were foreigners and that 80 per cent of people who watched were Chinese who wanted to improve their English proficiency and had no other channel available. (2009)

most international news organisations are scaling down their international presence, China is betting on large expansion.²² It plans to deploy journalists to over 50 countries, to more than double the number of international bureaus it had in 2008, 19, and to set up six international broadcasting centres for news gathering and production (Zhao & Zhu 2008b: 76). The third keyword is quality, which has been a consistent downfall of CCTV's international operations. The re-launch of CCTV-News needs to be seen as the start of the last phase in China's international broadcasting efforts. It is clearly the most challenging task so far as it does not only require resources, one of the three elements in the efficiency equation discussed earlier, but it brings in issues of credibility and connecting with audiences. These, as I will try to explain next, are cross-cutting challenges faced by most of CCTV's foreign-language channels, including CCTV-E.

CCTV-E, the testing lab

CCTV International started to recruit Spanish speakers to take part in a pilot project to broadcast some of its content in Spanish in 2003. At the time, say some of the people interviewed, there was no clear indication on the intention to launch a Spanish-only language channel. For a period of about six months from late 2003 to mid-2004, foreign workers (mostly Latin Americans) with a good command of English and Chinese dubbed, voice-overed or did live interpretation of newscasts, live events and press conferences from CCTV-9 content.²³ Some subtitling services were also available at the time for certain documentaries, but special attention was placed on live coverage of events. The Spanish language service did not primarily serve the purpose of 'exporting' Chinese culture/values, but that of relaying in different languages as much of its core politically sensitive contents, such as relevant weekly press conferences. This period of testing soon led to the creation of CCTV E&F, a separate news and entertainment channel that relayed differentiated content in Spanish and French. Content was broadcasted in 4-hour blocks alternating between the two languages and at times that fitted so called primetime in receiving countries.²⁴ The broadcasting time in each language was later extended. The Spanish programmes hoped to reach audiences in Latin

²² The *South China Morning Post* reported in January 2009 that the government was planning on investing 45 million yuan (around 6.6 billion US dollars) in Chinese state media (CCTV, Xinhua and *People's Daily*) foreign ventures (Wu & Chen 2009: 1).

²³ This had been done previously, for example, on the occasion of the Spring Festival Gala, CCTV's landmark show, which is was dubbed into English for several years, and is still today broadcasted in multiple languages.

²⁴ The Spanish content was broadcasted between 8am and 12pm Beijing time, which roughly equals to evening prime time in South America (between 8pm and 12pm, depending on the time zone).

America, whilst the French ones were aimed at French-speaking countries in Africa. The interest in these two regions, seen in 2004 as highly strategic in China's multipolar world view, was clearly superior to any interest in reaching the European countries where the two languages are spoken, Spain and France. The very crowded television markets in Spain and France seemed more out of reach than the still developing industry in Africa, or the heavily Americanised sector in Latin America. The decision to launch operations in these two markets might have responded to two objectives: portray China as a 'model of development', particularly in Africa,²⁵ and to counter-balance the influence of the US in certain world regions, notably Latin America.

The task of approaching Latin American audiences before 2004 had been a domain reserved to China Radio International (CRI) and some ideological magazines published in Spanish that were popular amongst certain Leftist movements in the region. CRI had landed in Latin America in 1981 when it opened its first bureau in Mexico City. Seven years later the second one followed in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and, in 1999, the third centre was opened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. News gathering in other countries had been largely done, and it still is, through embassy personnel. This tells us a great deal about the understanding, amongst Chinese elites and policy makers, of news broadcasting more as a task carried out by public information (propaganda/publicity) officials rather than journalists. In any case, these CRI news-gathering bureaus in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil were created to generate content for Chinese-language radio stations in China and were not broadcasting in the region. Still the case of CRI serves as a good example of how Latin American countries have become less strategic in China's public diplomacy strategy in general and, more particularly, in its international broadcasting efforts.²⁶ In 2006 CRI launched an ambitious project to open 100 overseas stations that would broadcast content produced in China to local audiences, both in Chinese and local languages. The completion of the project would allow China to have the second largest foreign radio service in the world only surpassed by the BBC World Service with 145 stations. The first of these stations was opened in Nairobi, Kenya, in March 2006 and the second one was launched in Vientiane, Laos, in November (China Daily 2006). China did not open its first overseas radio station in Latin America until December 2010; 48 stations had been launched before, mostly in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The city chosen for the

²⁵ Some documents referred to the African markets as in need of educational and service oriented programmes. (<http://blog.cntv.cn/7089247-1087.html>). Accessed: 12 September 2011

²⁶ It is arguable that using public diplomacy as the sole instrument to evaluate the relevance of a region in foreign policy is not scientifically infallible, but other indicators such as high ranking officials visits to Latin American countries could also be used to support such a statement.

first Latin American station was Tijuana, Mexico, because of its proximity to the United States. The target public of the station, according to officials at CRI, are the Hispanic population in the bordering states between Mexico and the US. Another hint at the fact that Africa or the Middle East have now surpassed Latin America (or at least Spanish speaking countries in the region) in strategic value, can be derived from the opening dates of CCTV's network of television broadcasting centres abroad.²⁷ Of all centres, the last one to start operations was the one in Sao Paulo, Brazil. It seems relevant to note the selection of Brazil as the Latin American base, even if one takes into consideration that Sao Paulo was the only South American where CCTV kept a foreign correspondent. The office opened in 2007. The doubts that I am casting over how strategic Spanish-language broadcasts have become, were certainly not there in 2004 when the Spanish/French channel started. In interviews given shortly after the launch of CCTV E&F, the director of the Spanish channel, Ye Lulu explained that the selection of Spanish as the second foreign language for international broadcasting in China had been done on two premises: the number of speakers and the growing "interest in Hispanic culture in China." (López 2004)

When it started operating, CCTV employed for its Spanish language television service 48 people, 20 of which were hired as 'foreign experts'.²⁸ The number of employees had grown to 125 (96 Chinese nationals and 29 'foreign experts') in 2007 when CCTV-E was turned into an independent channel (Díez 2007). A clear division of tasks and responsibilities between the two groups, Chinese personnel and foreign workers, was put in place from the beginning and has not changed since. The job of foreign workers in the different departments is strictly limited to translating content from English to Spanish. A good amount of them have no background in communication or journalism studies, but in translation. For somebody working for the news desk or the documentaries department, the usual list of tasks on any given day can include translation, video re-editing and voice-overing. Foreign workers are not expected to produce stories, documentaries or programmes on their own. Topic selection, time allocation and raking of items in news bulletins are tasks reserved to their Chinese counterparts. As for Chinese staff, a three tier system seems to be in place, according to information provided by interviewees. The top management within CCTV-E has experience

²⁷ There are a total number of 7 centres. The European centre in London, UK, the American centre in Washington, US, the Russian centre in Moscow, the African centre in Nairobi, Kenya, the Asia-Pacific centre in Hong Kong, the Middle-East centre in Dubai, UAE, and the Latin America centre in Sao Paulo, Brazil. These news gathering and production centres are meant to serve, basically, the Chinese and English language channels and are part of the overall strategy to increase the number of CCTV's foreign bureaus to 56. The centres are built with capabilities to broadcast live from the studio and to feed locally produced news content.

²⁸ There were six countries represented, Mexico, Spain, Peru, the US, Colombia and Cuba.

in bureaucratic positions both within the communications sector and outside of it. For example, the director, Ye Lulu, had worked for CCTV-9 as deputy content manager before joining the Spanish-language channel. The role at managerial level is more administrative than editorial. Content guidelines are supervised by senior staff, some of whom have served in positions at diplomatic missions in Latin America, and whose command of Spanish and knowledge of 'the official party doctrine' qualifies them to identify sensitive topics and to use pertinent official jargon. These content-editors and supervisors work alongside programme directors, whose role is to select contents.²⁹ The bottom tier includes young graduates, not from Schools of Journalism but mostly from Faculties of Spanish Language, Culture and Literature, with a decent command of Spanish and whose job is similar to that of 'foreign experts'. They translate stories from English and, seldom attend events on which they later report specifically for CCTV-E. Only Chinese nationals act as reporters.³⁰

The lack of professionalism and previous experience in the television is seen as a constraint in the development of the channel. Scholars who analysed CCTV-9 before the reforms in 2010 and 2011 highlighted poor quality content and amateurism as two important factors for low audiences (Jirik 2009; Bakshi 2011: 149). The case of CCTV-E, which has not gone through a similar process of 'professionalization', should be read in different terms. Not hiring people trained in journalism responds to the understanding of the station as a copycat channel, a replica, of its English-language counterpart and not as a place open to creativity and specifically designed programming for Spanish speaking audiences. In this sense CCTV's international channels have been following rules and practices crafted for media deemed for domestic consumption, even though they are not. They have been operating in similar terms to those other state-owned media outlets whose ultimate role is to 'guide public opinion' (*yúlùn dǎoxiàng*). However, guidance at home and guidance abroad do not respond to exactly the same stimuli. The reform of CCTV-9 might be seen as the path that other foreign language channels might take in the future.

The total number of potential viewers and the evolution of the actual audience of China's international broadcasting are figures that are not often publicly revealed. Leaving aside this lack of transparency (which is also a lack of means to efficiently monitor audience ratings), it is incontestable that the reach of CCTV E&F was very limited in 2004 when the channel was

²⁹ Recently an editorial board constituted by representatives of each of the foreign-language channels has been created, but the exact mission of the board is unclear.

³⁰ As for the dozen of news anchors and TV hosts, roughly 60% of are non-Chinese and 40% Chinese.

launched and remained considerably low in 2007 when broadcasting hours were expanded. **Chart 1** provides details about most of the countries that, in late 2010, were able to receive the signal of CCTV and the total number of subscribers in each country according to figures found on the official blog of CCTV International. The number of potential viewers –based on subscriptions for cable, satellite and IP-TV services– of the Spanish channel was, in 2010, 15.49 million. Despite being modestly low, it meant a considerable increase from a previous estimate given by Zhao & Zhu in 2008. The number of subscribers to cable and satellite services carrying CCTV-E was in 2008, 2.2 million (2008: 160). As shown in the chart, the vast majority of current subscribers are located in the United States, which on paper does not fall into the target area of the channel.³¹

Chart 1 - Number of subscribers to cable and satellite services relaying CCTV-E by country in 2010

Country	Month/Year of availability	Number of subscribers
United States	10/2004	14,010,000
Cuba	10/2004	30,000
Chile	10/2005	3,000
Bolivia	02/2007	70,000
Mexico	06/2007	589,000
Panama	10/2007	26,000
Brazil	10/2007	4,000
Honduras	10/2008	65,800
Guyana	08/2009	1,100
Dutch Antilles	04/2010	3,000
Spain	10/2008	601,500
Poland	03/2009	100
Russia	03/2009	-
Romania	03/2009	83,071
TOTAL		15,486,571

Source: <http://blog.cntv.cn/7089247-1110.html>

To overcome the limited reach of foreign-language programming China has taken two different measures. It first decided to go into the sector of satellite-service providers and,

³¹ There are also some other countries such as Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, where it is possible to tune into CCTV-E but because no subscription is required, they are not included in official counts. The reason why some ‘Great Wall’ subscribing countries, such as Peru itself are not included in the list is not clear from the information available on the blog.

more recently, it started to increase the online presence of Chinese television content on the Internet. On October 1, 2004 –the day CCTV-E&F went on air– China launched an overseas satellite platform, dubbed ‘The Great Wall Satellite TV Platform’, with over 20 channels, including the majority of CCTV’s channels (both domestic and international) but also some regional stations such as the popular Hunan TV, the influential Beijing TV, and Dragon TV, broadcasting from Shanghai.³² The ‘Great Wall’ was initially introduced in the American market but has developed different versions for different continents. The last localized package to be introduced, after the American, Canadian, European and Asian versions, was the one for Latin America. It was first commercialized on January 1, 2008 in most countries of Central and South America. The target audience of the ‘Great Wall’ platform, which requires a monthly fee and carries mostly Chinese language channels, are Chinese overseas communities. This is why, for example, Peru, the country with the largest Chinese community in the continent, was one of the first countries to have a decent number of subscribers (Zhao & Zhu 2008b: 173). It is hoped that the channel can attract non-ethnic Chinese audiences in the longer term. For this same purpose, broadcasting online has been recently embraced by CCTV as it has very reduced costs of transmission and an unlimited amount of viewers. The provision of content online is being funnelled through China Network Television (CNTV), the online division of CCTV, which was created in 2009. According to its website, CNTV wants to be a “globalized, multilingual and multi-terminal public webcast service platform.”³³

In their detailed review of CCTV’s strategy for the medium and long term future, Zhao and Zhu fail to identify clear tangible objectives in terms of audience increase. They do cite the very broad intention of having CCTV’s signal reach “four fifths of the world’s population” by 2011 but do not elaborate any further on how to actually make people tune in to CCTV (2008b:). This lack of an audience-specific strategy³⁴ for each of the different channels (with the more recent exception of English-language content) has meant that none of the different changes that CCTV-E has gone through since 2004 has had a significant impact on viewers’ attitudes. When on October 1, 2007 CCTV-E was launched as an independent channel its


³² The international commercialization of Chinese television clearly falls under the objective of taking content produced in China abroad in order to increase exposure of its cultural industries, but not exclusively. There is also a strong desire to reach overseas Chinese communities, who had been outside the reach of CPC’s sponsored media ‘guidance’ for years. Content from Taiwan and Hong Kong started to reach Europe, the US and South-East Asia via somewhat mainstream services as early as 1979 (Zhu 2009: 228)

³³ The official website is <http://www.cntv.cn/>. There are several different versions of CNTV, some for domestic consumption (Tibetan, Mongolian and Korean) and some for international audiences (English, French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian). All different versions have video-on-demand services and some have live video streams.

³⁴ The lack of strategies to engage with audiences makes it more difficult to achieve the ultimate goal of China’s international broadcasting: having China’s voice heard abroad.

basic structure was configured around three thematic pillars: information, documentaries, and Chinese culture. These have remained untouched since, even though time allocation, formats and specific programmes are periodically changed. About 39 per cent of air time at CCTV-E is reserved to documentary programmes, 28 per cent to television dramas, 22 per cent to news and current affairs, and the remaining 11 per cent is time for cultural and educational programmes. I will leave a more detailed analysis of newscasts for the last section of this paper and will discuss the other three here.

Chart 2 – Time allocated to different types of programmes on CCTV’s foreign language channels



By far documentaries take up the largest amount of time of CCTV-E’s schedule as in most of other foreign-language channels at CCTV, as shown on **Chart 2**. The selection of films or series comes from English-language channels, either CCTV-News or CCTV-9 Documentary. The small department in charge of documentaries at CCTV-E claims to have

no direct choice over titles and no documentary production is done by the department. A look at some examples of series broadcasted reveals a diversified list of topics. There are programmes dealing specifically with touristic destinations in China, with the history of the country, with remarkable achievements by Chinese scientists and other more general topics both about contemporary China and abroad. As an example of the double reading that can be done on these documentaries, it is possible to look at a series on the Xisha islands, usually called Paracel Islands in English. The archipelago, under the administration of China, is claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. The 9-episode long series shows the pristine beaches of the islands and the unique fauna and flora, but also discusses the presence of the Chinese armed forces although there are no references to the territorial dispute. Documentaries at CCTV-E claim to be, 'objective and truthful'. If we combine on-air time for documentaries and cultural and educational programmes we would find that they take up half of total programming time. I have differentiated the two because there are differences in production and content. Chinese culture on CCTV-E specifically refers to language, cooking and 'traditional' arts. At some point in the past it also included martial arts, as it still does in other CCTV international channels. It is interesting to note how this selection of programmes, topics and representative elements of 'Chinese culture' not only constitutes an attempt to construct a narrative of contemporary China abroad, but it also helps shaping a discourse of what constitutes 'Chinese culture' and what does not.

Television dramas come second in allocated time. CCTV-E broadcasts two Chinese dramas a day with Spanish subtitles. Latin America is considerably well known for its passionate *telenovelas* and its equally passionate followers. It seems coherent that fiction, a much softer approach than news and current affairs programmes, plays a role in the winning of *hearts and minds*. There is no literature available on the impact and effects of these shows in foreign audiences, but there are plenty of studies that discuss the construction of a normative China in television dramas through the selection of topics and plot development, as well as the supervisory role played by the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television, that has the ultimate word on content recommendations and forbidden topics (Zhu et al. 2008; Zhu 2008). The successful South Korean and Japanese experiences in exporting television dramas to overseas markets, including Latin America, reinforces the potential to create room for television content produced in China through getting foreign audiences used to the particular Chinese television narrative. The interest of China in exploring the *soft power* potential of dramas goes beyond the case of CCTV-E. Chinese broadcasters have recently engaged in two

projects that involve cooperation with companies in Spanish-speaking countries. In Spain, the Drama Centre of the Shanghai Media Group co-produced in 2004 *Qīng xiàn basèluōnà*, a drama that takes place in 'trendy Barcelona' and in 'vibrant Shanghai', and Mexico's Televisa and CCTV's international division signed an agreement to move from a long running exchange of programmes to the production of a new drama set in contemporary China. There has been an apparent 'cultural gap' dividing television markets in Asia and the so-called 'West' but, as Zhu, Keane and Bai argue the success of Korean TV "has impelled producers to re-examine the kinds of appeal that their cultural products have for transnational audiences." (2008: 16)


CCTV-E's more direct, but not necessarily more effective, approach to the goal of (re)shaping public opinion abroad is through its current affairs programmes. Approximately one fifth of air time is reserved to current affairs programmes, but this time increases when special programmes are scheduled. These have recently included the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the CPC or the latest developments in China's aerospace industry. It currently has on its regular schedule, two talk-shows, a business news bulletin and several editions of its main newscast, called *Noticiero*.

Case Study: *Noticiero*

In this last section I will present some results of a content analysis of the night edition of *Noticiero* in order to gather some elements that might help list some of the key features in China's self-proclaimed narrative on world affairs. The sample for the analysis is constituted by four-teen editions of *Noticiero*. In order to avoid distortion in the results due to the predominance of a particular developing story or season specific topics, the samples have been selected from fourteen different days of 2011. Two seven-day weeks have been 'constructed' by selecting non-consecutive weeks and days from the months of January to July (Week I) and from April to August (Week II). I have chosen the 9pm edition (Beijing local time) of *Noticiero* as it is meant to be a summary of stories from all previous editions of that same day. The length of each newscast is between 25 and 30 minutes, approximately the same length of CCTV's top news programme in Chinese-language, *Xīnwén liánbò*. The size of the sample is admittedly small, but can be trusted as representative given the very standardized style of the newscast, with clearly defined thematic blocs that are seldom modified.

The analysis revealed a repeating pattern in the format of the news bulletin. As detailed in **Chart 3**, the newscast is divided into three clearly separated sections. The first one carries mostly news about China and, in very special cases, some international events. One of the examples of an international event that made it through to the opening segment found in the bulletins analysed, was that of the nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011. The items in the first section of the bulletin usually refer to activities by Chinese leaders, bilateral meetings, domestic political and social issues, and the economy. The ranking of news does not seem to respond to criteria of newsworthiness used in other news channels. The first story very frequently involved Hu Jintao, as the highest ranking member of the CPC, and is usually followed by Wen Jiabao. Activities by other members of the Politburo usually follow.³⁵ The second section, usually the shortest of the three, is focused on international news with most attention being placed on Asian current affairs, as I will discuss later on. News sources for this second segment are not exclusively reports from other CCTV outlets, but according to interviewees it is frequent that stories are picked from Xinhua. The third section, which lasts for about 5 to 7 minutes, carries exclusively culture-related news. Typical reports include regional festivals, concerts, theatre plays, film premieres and 'traditional' expressions of Chinese culture.

Chart 3. Organisation of topics and segments in *Noticiero*



³⁵ These criteria of newsworthiness fall in line with those of other official media outlets, such as the *People's Daily*.

Regarding issue salience, meaning the topics that editors deemed most important on each news bulletin, was another element looked at. The element that I use to quantify issue salience was headline selection and order of topics in the headlines. There was a predominance of Asian-related issues (54 per cent) in headlines, with China being the most cited country. Stories in which bilateral meetings were discussed came second, at 19.6 per cent with China, as well, being one of the two countries mentioned in the story. It seems interesting to note that stories on China are considered the central topic of news bulletin. This contrasts sharply with other international state broadcasters, such as France 24 and BBC, which carry mostly international news and reports. Issue salience could have been further explored by looking at the order of news in the bulletin itself, but due to the rigid division of the programme it would not have brought any extra relevant information.

Chart 4. Country occurrence in news stories (in absolute numbers)

Country	Occurrence	Country	Occurrence
China	112	Australia	3
Libya	16	Yemen	2
Japan	14	Singapore	2
United States	12	Mexico	2
Korea North	5	Israel	2
Korea South	4	Hungary	2
Spain	5	Germany	2
South Sudan	4	Egypt	2
Pakistan	4	Cambodia	2
Thailand	3	Brazil	2
Taiwan	3	Afghanistan	2
France	3	Other	22
Total Stories: 188			


It seems important to signal at this point that CCTV-E is conceived, similarly to its English-language counterpart, as a ‘Window on China and the World’, in order to understandable why China places first in issue salience and, also in issue occurrence. As **Chart 4** shows, China is referred to 112 stories, out of the 188 analysed; that makes a percentage of 59.5.³⁶ The fact that Libya places second is attributable to the on-going conflict in the country that has lasted

³⁶ For each story more than one country was counted when the news item referred to a bilateral meeting or an event involving multiple countries or regions. Therefore, the overall count exceeds the number of stories.

for almost the entire duration of the period analysed (January-August 2011). The relevance of data from other countries might come in the shape of non-salience of particular nations.

A look at regional balance, as shown in **Chart 5**, again shows that Asia is predominant. Quite strikingly, stories on Latin American affairs come in sixth place with 7 out of 188 stories, just making barely 3.7 per cent. This can be explained in two ways. First of all, as one CCTV worker explained during an interview, the channel has not amongst its objectives to report specifically on the region, as CCTV does not have the human resources to be able to gather information on the ground. The second explanation, much more practical, and less ideological, is the fact that most of the reports broadcasted on CCTV-E, as explained earlier, come from CCTV-News International or the Chinese-language equivalent, CCTV-新闻. As Latin America is not one of the main areas in the agenda, the number of stories on both channels is low. This could start to change, nonetheless, after the launch of the Latin American broadcasting centre. The lack of interest in creating its own narrative on the development of the region or the political events that shape the continent, contrasts sharply with the eagerness to report on African, for example, on the French language channel. A news bulletin exclusively on African news is broadcasted four-times a day on CCTV-E.

Chart 5. Region occurrence in news stories (per cent)



The two last items examined that produced relevant data refer to the topics of the stories and the type of reports. Before discussing the earlier, I will briefly comment on format of news

stories. There is a predominance of short reports, less than 60 seconds. On an average news bulletin, there can be five to eight short stories, usually in the China and International news sections. One third of the news items are featured stories that last between 1 and 3 minutes. It is frequent that these are CCTV produced stories, compared to the shorter ones, which usually are based on footage and content provided by international news agencies or Xinhua. A very small portion, about 3 per cent (one story every other day), of news reports are produced by CCTV-E's staff. Usually these stories are related to Sino-Hispanic relations and are shot in Beijing.

Chart 6. Topic occurrence in news stories (in absolute numbers)

Country	Occurrence	Country	Occurrence
Diplomacy	35	Culture	41
Economy	27	War/Conflict	30
Environment	21	Catastrophes	20
Foreign Affairs	37	Festivities	2
Technology	3	Education	4
Domestic Politics	7		
			Total Stories: 188

The last point that I wanted to touch upon in this section is that of theme/topic of stories covered. In purely quantitative terms four words are repeated more often than others in news reports: cooperation, development, growth and economy (*cooperación, desarrollo, crecimiento* and *economía*).³⁷ If CCTV-E is in fact contributing to create a narrative on contemporary China, it is one that has quite a lot to do with economic development and with China's engagement with the world. When crossing some of the data presented so far, with **Chart 6**, which shows topic recurrence in news stories, some elements come to light. China's diplomatic efforts to cooperate with other countries are a central part of the official Chinese discourse to foreign audiences. This is complemented with recurrent references to China's economic development and growth, which is often labelled as sustainable. The chart above also shows that cultural issues rank particularly high in absolute and relative numbers. The rigid structure of the news bulletin, in which a set amount of time is reserved daily for cultural reports, can explain this 'distortion', but not exclusively. Cultural achievements and cultural

³⁷ The word count excludes grammatical elements, words with no specific meaning and very common but non-relevant terms in this case. One of the most frequently used words is, in fact, China which is used over 200 times. The words indicated have the following values: cooperation (39 times), development (31), growth (25) and economy (21).

exchanges have long been part of Communist propaganda and remain an element of both domestic cohesion and external promotion. Part of the reason for which cultural features have long been prominent in Chinese media is also to be found in some of the principles of journalism in China. All Chinese media are expected to carry more positive news items than negative ones, following the journalistic guidelines created by Mao Zedong in the 1950s. Therefore, crime and public unrest are largely absent from newscast and only natural catastrophes and accidents are discussed. Even these stories, however, are framed in positive terms by, for instance, celebrating the excellent work of rescue teams or the courage of those affected. In the selection of process there is a clear 'manipulation' component, both because of the elements that are not featured and because of the topics chosen. And the relevance given to news items about activities of state officials does not contribute to get rid of the image of international television broadcasting as a 'fancy propaganda tool'. Cull has noted that for a nation's international broadcasting messages to become relevant it needs to show it is broadcasting without direct interference of the authorities (Cull 2008; Cull 2009). However, in the case of CCTV-E there is a continuum between government sources and contents. China's television journalism largely relies on official statements, public information news releases and party documents. It is very frequent that news reports that are based on official statements carry no critical analysis or interpretation. There is only one example, in the 14 editions analysed here, where (controlled) critical opinions are expressed. CCTV-E carried a report after the train accident in Wenzhou in which a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences openly criticised the attempts to cover-up the accident. Even in this case, the criticism responded to requests by the Publicity Department to briefly make room for self-criticism as social pressure was growing, particularly in social media.

Conclusions

China has made it clear that it wants to master public diplomacy as a necessary first step to improving its image abroad. The country's unequal capacities in terms of hard and soft power are currently being addressed by using several practices, instruments and tools. International television broadcasting tops the list in terms of investment, but the high costs of building a strong multi-lingual multi-platform information system are not directly reverting in changes in public opinion abroad. Several surveys have shown that China is still perceived negatively in several world regions, particularly in Europe and America. Chinese officials have blamed foreign media for their allegedly negative framing of reports on China and thus hoped that the

creation of a strong international television system could, in the medium and long term, change the current narrative on China. However, the capacity of the country to influence foreign public opinions remains largely symbolical. In order for public diplomacy to become effective three elements have to be balanced: resources, audiences and credibility. China has invested heavily on developing its international broadcasting system, including its Spanish-language channel, CCTV-E. However, the efficiency of any public diplomacy strategy drops dramatically, when audiences fail to welcome the messages of states. Power, particularly soft power, is based on attraction: the attraction of culture, values and ideas. Unless Chinese media manage to leave behind the perception that their message is not exclusively the message of the CPC, it seems unlikely that foreign audiences will react to the new discourse. Other issues that have been signalled as shortfalls for the success of China's international broadcasting efforts are amateurism in content production and inexistent adaption to the needs and requests of local audiences, both in terms of formats and narrative styles.

Latin America was in 2004, when CCTV-E went on air, a considerable priority in China's foreign policy. Its relevance in China's understanding of a multipolar world has not been completely washed away, but I have argued that it has lost part of the appeal that it initially seem to have. Even if it has become a mostly peripheral area, it still lays on the target areas of China's public diplomacy efforts particularly in the wider efforts to create spaces for more positive narratives on its current development. In this paper I have presented the outcome of an empirical analysis of CCTV-E's main newscast in order to find correlations between public diplomacy strategies, messages and narratives in China and television content. Data has shown that there are clear guidelines on the contents of television shows. The narrative that is trying to challenge already existing discourses portrays China as a cooperative state that places its engagement with other states at the top of the list of priorities. CCTV-E's newscast (and, by extension, those in other languages as content is largely shared by all international stations) place particular attention on the positive side of China's economic development and growth. It has also been posited that CCTV international channels attempt to become agenda setters in Asian affairs although, as mentioned earlier, there are a series of elements that are hindering these efforts: lack of professionalism, difficulty to connect with audiences and extreme dependency on official statements as prime sources of information.

Polls have shown that the challenge to create more favourable views amongst foreign audience is more evident in America and Europe, where liberal democratic societies consider

Chinese media as mere 'propaganda machines'. Precisely because these areas are highly influential in the creation of global narratives on current affairs, CCTV seems to be in need to redesign part of its strategy to, not only retain the favourable views held by many in Africa and Latin America, but to actually influence opinion makers in strategic countries such as France, the United Kingdom or Spain. The possibilities to make a difference might not lie exclusively on CCTV's international broadcasting efforts, but on finding ways to export and distribute content produced in China through local media outlets. The stigmatisation of CCTV as a mouthpiece of Chinese propaganda might take a considerable time to be erased. If Chinese leaders expect results from the 'media go out' policy to be achieved in the very long term, the current strategies might eventually pay off. Experience in other media outlets has shown that after the initial investment, comes the improvement of quality and, finally, the ability to effectively transmit messages. However, if the consolidation of a counter-hegemonic discourse is expected to happen in the short-term, decisive actions need to be taken to redress the existing inefficiencies.

References

- BOOKMILLER, K.N.** (1992): *The War of Words without the War: Radio Moscow, the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, and the Voice of America in the Old and New International Order*. [Doctoral dissertation] Charlottesville: University of Virginia
- BROWNE, D. R.** (1982): *International radio broadcasting: the limits of the limitless medium*. New York: Praeger.
- CHANG, W. H.** (1989): *Mass media in China : the history and the future*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- CHINA DAILY** (2006): 'For 65 years, a window to the world' in *China Daily*, 4 December 2006. Available online: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/home/2006-12/04/content_749162.htm. Accessed: 29 August 2011
- CHO, Y.N.; JEONG, J.H.** (2008): 'China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects' in *Asian Survey*, 48(3), pp. 453-472.
- CLARK, A. M.; WERDER, O.** (2007): 'Analyzing International Radio Stations' in *International Communication Gazette*, 69(6), pp. 525 -537.
- CORMAN, S.R.; TRETHERWEY, A.; GOODALL, JR., H.L.** (2008): *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*. Berlin: Peter Lang.

CRUZ DE CASTRO, R. (2009): 'Confronting China's Charm Offensive in East Asia : A Simple Case of Fighting Fire with Fire?' *Issues And Studies*, 45(1), pp.71-116.

CULBERT, D. (2010): 'Public Diplomacy and The International History of Mass Media: The USA, The Kennedy Assassination, and The World' in *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 30(3), pp. 421-432.

CULL, N.J. (2008): 'Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories' in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), pp. 31-54.

CUSHION, S.; LEWIS, J. [EDS.] (2010): *The Rise of 24-Hour News Television: Global Perspectives*. Berlin: Peter Lang.

DÍEZ, P. (2008): 'La TV en español ya tiene canal propio en China' in *ABC*, 7 January 2008, p. 106

DREYER, J. T. (2005): 'From China With Love: P.R.C. Overtures in Latin America' in *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 12(2), 85-98.

EDWARDS, L. (2001): *Mediapolitik: How the Mass Media Have Transformed World Politics*. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.

ELLIS, E. R. (2011): Chinese Soft Power in Latin America A Case Study. *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, 60, pp. 85-91.

FIJALKOWSKI, Ł. (2011): 'China's 'soft power' in Africa?' in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(2), pp. 223-232.

FREDERICK, H. H. (1993): *Global communication and international relations*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

GILBOA, E. (2006): 'Public diplomacy: The missing component in Israel's foreign policy' in *Israel Affairs*, 12(4), pp. 715-47.

GILBOA, E. (2008): 'Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy', in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), pp. 55-77.

GILL, B.; HUANG, Y. (2006): Sources and limits of Chinese 'soft power' in *Survival*, 48(2), pp.17-36.

GRUNIG, Y.; HUANG, J.E. (2000): 'From organizational effectiveness to relationship indicators: Antecedents of relationships, public relationships strategies and relationship outcomes' in **LEDINGHAM, J.A.; BRUNING, S.D.** [Ed.]: *Public relations as relationship management: A relational approach to the study and practice of public relations*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associate, pp. 23-54

HELLER, K.S; PERSSON, L.M. (2009): 'The Distinction Between Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy' in **SNOW, N., TAYLOR, P. M.** [Eds.]: *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy*. New York: Routledge, pp. 225-231

- JIRIK, J.C.** (2008): *Making news in the People's Republic of China: The case of CCTV-9*. [Doctoral Dissertation] Austin, TX: The University of Texas.
- KELLEY, J.R.** (2009): 'Between "Take-offs" and "Crash Landings"' in **SNOW, N., TAYLOR, P. M.** [Eds.]: *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy*. New York: Routledge, pp. 72-84
- KOLMER, C.; SEMETKO, H. A.** (2010): 'International television news' in *Journalism Studies*, 11(5), pp. 700-717.
- KURLANTZICK, J.** (2007): *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- LEE, J. N.** (2009): 'China's soft power in East Asia: an estimation based on the outcome of surveys of six countries' in *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 21(2), pp.185-204.
- LÓPEZ, G.** (2004): 'Nuevo Canal de CCTV en español' in *China Hoy*, April 2004. Available online: <http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/hoy/2004/0404/15.htm>. Accessed: 15 July 2011
- NYE, J.** (2008): 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power' in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), pp.94 -109.
- NYE, J.** (2011): *Future of Power*. Washington DC: Public Affairs.
- MANZENREITER, W.** (2010) 'The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power' in *Journal of Sport & Social Issues*, 34(1), pp.29-48.
- MELISSEN, J.** [Ed.] (2005): *The new public diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- MILLER, D.B.** (2007): *Media Pressure on Foreign Policy: The Evolving Theoretical Framework*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- OPPERMANN, K.; VIEHRIG, H.** (2011): *Issue Saliency in International Politics*. London: Routledge.
- PAINTER, J.** (2008): *Counter-Hegemonic News – A case study of Al-Jazeera English and Telesur*. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.
- PENG, Z.** (2004): 'Representation of China: An across time analysis of coverage in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times' in *Asian Journal of Communication*, 14(1), pp. 53-67.
- POTTER, E.** (2002): 'Canada and the new public diplomacy' in *International Journal*, 63(1), pp. 43-64.
- PRICE, M. E.; HAAS, S.; MARGOLIN, D.** (2008): 'New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Reflections on Adaptations and Transformations' in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), pp. 150 -172.
- RAWNSLEY, G.D.** (2009): 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power for the Chinese Century' in **SNOW, N., TAYLOR, P. M.** [Eds.]: *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy*. New York: Routledge, pp. 282-291

ROBINSON, P. (2002): *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News Media, Foreign Policy and Intervention*. London: Routledge.

SCHNEIDER, C. P. (2009): 'The Unrealized Potential of Cultural Diplomacy: «Best Practices» and What Could Be, If Only...' in *The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, 39(4), pp. 260-279.

SCOLLON, R. (2000): 'Generic variability in news stories in Chinese and English: A contrastive discourse study of five days' newspapers' in *Journal of Pragmatics*, 32, pp. 761-791

SEIB, P. (2008): *The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World Politics*, Pittsburgh: Potomac Books Inc.

SEIB, P. (2009): *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

SNOW, N. (2009): 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy' in **SNOW, N., TAYLOR, P. M.** [Eds.]: *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy*. New York: Routledge, pp. 3-11

SNOW, N.; TAYLOR, P.M. (2006): 'The revival of the propaganda state' in *International Communication Gazette*, 68(5/6), pp. 389-407.

STONE, G. C.; XIAO, Z. (2007): 'Anointing a New Enemy' in *International Communication Gazette*, 69(1), pp. 91 -108.

SUN, W. (2009): 'Mission Impossible? Soft Power, Communication Capacity, and the Globalization of Chinese Media' in *International Journal of Communication*. 4(0), pp. 54-72.

SUZUKI, S. (2009): 'Chinese Soft Power, Insecurity Studies, Myopia and Fantasy' in *Third World Quarterly*, 30(4), pp.779-793.

TANAKA, N. (2009): 'International Television Broadcasting in East Asia: Current Situation and Challenges' in *NHK Broadcasting Studies*, 7, pp. 21-53

TUCH, H. (1990): *Communicating with the World: US public diplomacy overseas*. New York: St. Martin's.

TUDESQ, A.-J. (1997): *Les medias acteurs de la vie internationale*. Rennes: Apogée.

VICKERS, R. (2004): 'The new public diplomacy: Britain and Canada compared' in *British Journal of Politics and International Affairs*, 6, pp. 182-94.

WARLAUMONT, H. (2006): 'U.S. Reporting on China: A New Look at an Old Issue' in *International Communication Bulletin*, 41(1-2), pp. 65-75.

WOOD, J. (2000). *History of international broadcasting, Volume 2*. London: IET.

WU, V.; CHEN, A. (2009): 'Beijing in 45b yuan global media drive: State giants to lead image campaign' in *South China Morning Post*. 13 January 2009, p. 1.

WU, D.D.; NG, P. (2011): 'Becoming global, remaining local: the discourses of international news reporting by CCTV-4 and Phoenix TV Hong Kong' in *Critical Arts*, 25(1), pp.73-87.

YANG, D.L. (2008): 'Forced Harmony: China's Olympic Rollercoaster' in *Current History*, 107(710), pp. 243-249.

ZHANG, X. (2010): 'Chinese State Media Going Global' in *East Asian Policy*, 2(1), pp. 42-50.

ZHAO, H.; ZHU, B. (2008a): *Zhongyang dian shi tai fa zhan shi* [中央电视台发展史]. Beijing: China Radio & Television Publishing House

ZHAO, H.; ZHU, B. (2008b): *Zhongyang dian shi tai pin pai zhan lue* [中央电视台品牌战略]. Beijing: China Radio & Television Publishing House

ZHU, Y. (2008): *Television in post-reform China: serial dramas, Confucian leadership, and the global TV market*. London: Routledge.

ZHU, Y.; KEANE, M.; BAI, R. (2008): *TV Drama in China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.